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Abstract² This paper describes the use of a cost-minimisation 
algorithm to explore the potential impact of two options for 
financial support for low carbon generation in the form of 
contracts for difference in a system with locational marginal 
pricing: 1. with a system-wide strike price; 2. with locational 
strike prices. A two zone system is modelled with the additional 
financial support for low carbon generation represented as 
negative variable costs that have the effect of filling in the 
difference between wholesale market prices and the strike price, 
the latter intended to cover the long-run costs of low carbon 
generation. The British case is modelled in which there is a limit 
to the total top-up expenditure. It is shown that the case of a 
system-wide strike price can result in less new low carbon 
generation capacity compared with the case of locational strike 
prices, due to the increased top-up spend in the lower price zone 
more rapidly meeting the constraint on the total cost of top-up 
payments to low carbon generation. However, it is also shown 
that the imposition of this constraint leads to a failure of the 
model to settle on one solution due to the non-convex 
relationship between installed capacity of low carbon generation 
and wholesale market price. 
Index Terms²power system modelling, investment planning, 
cost-minimisation, zonal pricing, low carbon subsides  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Investment in power systems is often modelled using 
optimisation software which minimise the costs over a 
particular time horizon [1-3]. These models require inputs 
such as the capital and operating costs of different types of 
generators and can incorporate a number of policy 
interventions such as additional carbon taxes which increase 
the variable costs of particular generators. When appropriate 
costs and constraints are included, these optimisations can 
provide useful insights into how the generation mix may 
develop over time. 
Low carbon and renewable generation are for the most part 
not yet cost competitive with thermal generation such as 
CCGT, and are subsidized by governments to encourage 
investment in such projects. Modelling subsidies in cost-
minimisation software involves making appropriate changes 
to the costs against which the model optimizes. In the case of 
subsidies paid against energy output of generators this can be 
achieved by subtracting the subsidy from the variable costs ± 
effectively treating it as a negative variable cost. 
Subsidies to low carbon generation in Great Britain (GB) 
currently take the form of Feed-in-Tariffs with Contracts for 
Difference (CfDs) [4]. The CfD scheme involves a top-up 
payment added to a reference price based on the wholesale 
price in order that the contract holder receives an agreed 
strike price per MWh of generation. If the strike price is 
greater than the reference price, the generator is paid the 
difference, and if the strike price is less than the reference 
price, the generator has to pay the difference back. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1. Strike prices are allocated by 
competitive auction and the available spend on top-up 
payments is currently limited by the Levy Control 
Framework (LCF) budget [5].  
 
Figure 1. CfD mechanism illustration, from reference [4] 
Modelling CfD subsidies in a cost-minimisation problem 
is more complex than modelling a straightforward feed-in-
tariff, where a fixed payment is made per MWh generated, as 
CfD top-up payments to generators depend on the wholesale 
price of electricity which is itself an output of the 
optimisation. In order to set the correct value for the top-up 
payment each simulation needs, in effect, an estimation of 
what the output wholesale price will be. Assuming perfect 
competition, wholesale prices can be represented by the short 
run marginal cost (SRMC) of generation for each time period 
modelled. Introducing a negative cost (subsidy payment) to 
the variable costs of low carbon generation impacts the 
SRMC and thus has a feedback on the top-up payments. A 
solution which allows the impact of these feedback loops to 
be modelled in cost-minimisation software involves an 
iterative process where the output wholesale prices of one run 
are used to estimate the input top-up payments of the next run 
based on a strike price that stays fixed across iterations. The 
process is repeated until the output wholesale prices and input 
reference prices for top-up payments converge. However, 
convergence can only be guaranteed if a continuity and 
convexity condition are met, which this paper shows will not 
always be the case. 
A. Zonal pricing in GB 
A further complication to the modelling process is the 
consideration of possible multiple price zones in GB. The 
target model for the European electricity market has a 
requirement for zonal pricing for congestion management [6]. 
A known constraint on power transfers between Scotland and 
the rest of GB could warrant the establishment of Scotland as 
one bidding zone and England and Wales as another. How the 
CfD regime would adjust to consider two zonal prices within 
the same market, rather than a single system-wide price, is an 
open question. Zonal prices for Scottish generation would 
mostly likely be lower than those in the rest of GB due to 
large wind, nuclear and hydro capacities in Scotland and the 
low running costs of low carbon generation. These lower 
zonal prices would impact on CfD top-up payments, and if 
the government were to keep a single auction for GB-wide 
strike prices, a Scottish generator would use more of the LCF 
budget than one in England or Wales with the same strike 
price. This would result in less spend available for other low 
carbon projects. 
As the overall aim of the CfD scheme is to enable enough 
low carbon generation to meet the UKs decarbonisation 
commitments at least cost to the consumer, one option would 
be a requirement for separate strike prices for Scottish 
generators in order to (1) not use up the LCF budget too 
rapidly; and (2) to maintain the price signals to generation 
from zonal pricing. The auction process would thus have to 
take account of the relative uplift (top-up payments) from 
generation in either price zone to minimize the overall LCF 
spend for the maximum amount of low carbon generation.  
This paper explores the use of a cost-minimisation solver 
in the simulation of scenarios with zonal reference prices and 
zonal strike prices in a two zone GB system and compares the 
resultant installed capacity and total generation investment 
cost of these scenarios with a base case in which GB remains 
a single price zone. The modelling takes the form of a simple 
two node linear solver used to outline the modelling 
challenges in a clear and understandable framework. This 
solver is introduced in Section II. Section III presents the 
results for the zonal modelling scenarios compared with a 
base case scenario representing current market arrangements, 
Section IV discusses these results and the issues encountered 
and Section V draws the key conclusions from the work.  
II. REPRESENTATION OF LOW CARBON SUBSIDIES  
This section introduces a simple two node model designed 
to illustrate the impacts of subsidy payments and zonal 
pricing where the model mathematics are simple enough to 
easily interpret the results without additional constraints 
impacting upon their clarity. The model setup here results in 
an objective function which minimizes the total cost of 
energy and includes carbon pricing and the LCF as currently 
set up in GB. 
A.  Mathematical description ± two node model 
A two node model has been created to represent GB, in 
which one node represents Scotland and the other represents 
the rest of GB (rGB). Demand is split between the two nodes 
in accordance with present day demand as is modelled as 
increasing linearly at both nodes over a seven year timeframe. 
It has also been separated into a peak and off-peak block in 
each year. Candidate generators for investment are included 
as continuous variables of installed CCGT or wind at each 
node. Decision variables are the new installed capacity for 
each year and the dispatch of generation in each demand 
block. As demand increases in each year of the simulation, 
there must be an investment in some form of new generation 
every year in order to meet a total energy balance constraint. 
The objective function minimizes the discounted cost of 
investment and dispatch as follows:  ݉݅݊ ෍  ?ሺ ? ൅ ݎሻ௬ିଵ ሺܥܽ݌݁ݔ௚ǡ௬ Ǥ ܰܫܥ௚ǡ௬ ൅ ܱ݂݉݅ݔ௚Ǥ ܶܫܥ௚ǡ௬௚ǡ௬ǡ௕  ൅൫ܱ݉ݒܽݎ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ ൅ ܨܥ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ ൅ ܥܥ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ െ ܵݑܾݏ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕൯Ǥ ܩ݁݊௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ሻ     (1) 
whereݎ is the discount rate, ܥܽ݌݁ݔ௚ǡ௬ is the capital cost 
associated with installing each type of generation ݃ in each 
year ݕ, ܰܫܥ௚ǡ௬ is the new installed capacity of each type of 
generation in each year, ܱ݂݉݅ݔ௚ is the operation and 
maintenance fixed cost for generation type ݃, ܶܫܥ௚ǡ௬ is the 
total installed capacity of each type of generation in each 
year, ܱ݉ݒܽݎ௚ǡ௕ is the variable operation and maintenance 
costs for each type of generation in each demand block ܾ, ܨܥ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕are the fuel costs associated with each type of 
generation in each demand block and year, ܥܥ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ are the 
carbon costs associated with each type of generation in each 
demand block and year, ܵݑܾݏ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ is the CfD subsidy (top-up 
payment) to each generator in each demand block and year 
and ܩ݁݊௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ is the total generation for each generator in each 
demand block and year. 
      The following constraints are applied, representing that 
the generation in each block and year must not exceed each 
generators maximum capacity factor (2), that generation in all 
blocks and years must meet demand in all blocks and years 
(3) and that the generation at the Scottish node and rGB node 
in each block and year must not be greater than the node 
demand in each block and year plus the transfer capacity (4): ܩ݁݊௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ ൑  ܯܥܨ௚Ǥ ݐܾǤ ܶܫܥ௚ǡ௬ (2) ෍ ܩ݁݊௚ǡ௬ǡ௕௚ ൌ ܦ݁݉௕ǡ௬ (3) ܩ݁݊௭ǡ௬ǡ௕ ൑ ܦ݁݉௭ǡ௬ǡ௕ ൅ ܲܶܥ௬ǡ௕ (4) 
where ܯܥܨ௚ is the maximum capacity factor for each 
generator, ݐ௕ is the time period of each block, ܦ݁݉௬ǡ௕ is the 
demand in each block and year, the subscript ݖ represents 
each zone/node, and ܲܶܥ௬ǡ௕ is the transfer capacity limit in 
each block and year. To represent a scenario without 
transmission constraints ܲܶܥ௬ǡ௕ is set to a number higher than 
total model demand. 
      Capital costs are discounted using the ratio of annuity 
factors shown in (5) to take account of the model time 
horizon of seven years, assuming a generator economic 
lifetime of twenty-five years. ܥܽ݌݁ݔ௚ǡ௬ ൌ ܶܥܽ݌݁ݔ௚ Ǥ ܣ݊݊ܣ݉݋ݎݐܣ݊݊ܯ௬  (5) 
where ܶܥܽ݌݁ݔ௚ is the total capital expenditure, before 
annuity factor adjustment, and ܣ݊݊ܣ݉݋ݎݐ and ܣ݊݊ܯ௬ are 
the annuity factors for the amortization time and model 
lifetime for each generator given in (6) and (7) below: 
ܣ݊݊ܣ݉݋ݎݐ ൌ  ݎሺ ? ൅ ݎሻ௔௠௢௥௧ିଵሺ ? ൅ ݎሻ௔௠௢௥௧ െ  ? (6) ܣ݊݊ܯ௬ ൌ  ݎሺ ? ൅ ݎሻ௬௥௘௠ିଵሺ ? ൅ ݎሻ௬௥௘௠ െ  ? (7) 
where ܽ݉݋ݎݐ is the amortization time for the generator (set 
to 25 years for all generators in this model) and ݕݎ݁݉ is the 
remaining model lifetime for the generator, determined by the 
year of installation in the model time horizon. 
      The CfD top-up payment is calculated as the difference 
between the strike price and the reference price, the latter of 
which is assumed to be the annual average short run marginal 
cost (SRMC). The SRMC is calculated as the short-run costs 
(fuel, carbon costs and variable operational costs, minus any 
subsidy) of the marginal generator for each block, time 
averaged. Mathematically: ܵݑܾݏ௚ǡ௬ ൌ ܵݐݎ݅݇݁ ௚ܲ െ ܴܵܯܥ௬ (8) ܴܵܯܥ௬ ൌ ݉ܽݔ൫ܴܵܥ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ଵ൯ Ǥ ݐ௕ଵ ൅ ݉ܽݔ൫ܴܵܥ௚ǡ௬ǡ ܾ ?൯Ǥ ݐ௕ଶሺݐ௕ଵ ൅ ݐ௕ଶሻ  (9) ܴܵܥ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ ? ൌ ܱ݉ݒܽݎ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ ൅ ܨܥ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ ൅ ܥܥ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ െ ܵݑܾݏ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ (10) 
where ܵݐݎ݅݇݁ ௚ܲ is the strike price, set as the levelised cost of 
generation,ܴܵܯܥ௬ is the GB-wide SRMC in each year and ܴܵܥ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ is the short run costs of each generator in a certain 
demand block and year as shown in (10). As the SRMC is an 
output of the model, but also an input of the top-up payment 
calculation, the model has to be run several times and iterated 
until the output SRMC matches the input SRMC.  
      Reducing the operational costs of wind generation by use 
RIDVXEVLG\µSD\PHQW¶PDNHVZLQGJHQHUation comparatively 
cheaper to invest in than a CCGT. To ensure that the model 
invests in an appropriate amount of wind corresponding to 
GB policy, a representation of the LCF budget is included in 
the model as a constraint to the total subsidy spend, where the 
total top-up payments to all generators in all years must not 
exceed the overall LCF limit figure, as shown in (11):  
      
 ? ܵݑܾݏ௚ǡ௬ ൑ ܮܥܨ݈݅݉݅ݐ௚ǡ௬                       (11) 
B. Mathematical description ± zonal scenarios 
      To simulate zonal pricing using the two node model, the 
SRMC calculation has to be adapted for each zone so that in 
the case of transmission congestion separate zonal SRMCs 
are used as reference prices to calculate the zonal CfD top-up 
payments. When there is no congestion, the model-wide 
SRMC is calculated as in (9). When there is congestion the 
transfer capacity constraint (4) is active, and the adapted 
zonal SRMC calculation (12) is used, in which the zonal 
SRMC is calculated separately for the Scottish and rGB 
nodes based on the marginal generator occurring at each 
node. ܴܵܯܥ௭ǡ௬ ൌ ݉ܽݔ൫ܴܵܥ௭ǡ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ଵ൯ Ǥ ݐ௕ଵ ൅ ൫ܴܵܥ௭ǡ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ଶ൯ Ǥ ݐ௕ଶሺݐ௕ଵ ൅ ݐ௕ଶሻ  (12) 
      The two zonal scenarios represented are those discussed 
in Section I. The first includes top-up payments from a zonal 
reference price to a GB-wide strike price, assuming the 
current CfD auction system is unchanged on the introduction 
of zonal pricing. The second includes top-up payments to a 
zonal strike price, assuming CfD auction bids based on uplift, 
resulting in the same top-up payment to all generators no 
matter where they are located.  
      The zonal scenarios objective function is represented 
mathematically in (13): ݉݅݊ ෍  ?ሺ ? ൅ ݎሻ௬ିଵ ሺܥܽ݌݁ݔ௚ǡ௬ Ǥ ܰܫܥ௚ǡ௬ ൅ ܱ݂݉݅ݔ௚Ǥ ܶܫܥ௚ǡ௬௭ǡ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕  ൅൫ܱ݉ݒܽݎ௚ǡ௕ ൅ ܨܥ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ ൅ ܥܥ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ െ ܵݑܾݏ௭ǡ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕൯Ǥ ܩ݁݊௭ǡ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ሻ  (13) 
where ܵݑܾݏ௭ǡ௚ǡ௬ǡ௕ is the zonal subsidy to each generator in 
each block and year. Maximum capacity factor, demand-
matching and transmission capacity constraints are the same 
as shown previously in (2)-(4). 
      In the case of the GB strike price scenario, the subsidy 
payments are shown in (14): ܵݑܾݏ௭ǡ௚ǡ௬ ൌ ܵݐݎ݅݇݁ܲܩܤ௚ െ ܴܵܯܥ௭ǡ௬                (14) 
whereܵݐݎ݅݇݁ܲܩܤ݃ is the GB-wide strike price for wind 
generation. In the case of the zonal strike price scenario, the 
subsidy payments are shown in (15): ܵݑܾݏ௭ǡ௚ǡ௬ ൌ ܵݐݎ݅݇݁ ௭ܲǡ௚ െ ܴܵܯܥ௭ǡ௬                   (15) 
where ܵݐݎ݅݇݁ ௭ܲǡ௚ is the zonal strike price for wind generation. 
III. TWO BUS MODEL SCENARIOS AND RESULTS 
A. Scenarios and model input data 
      Due to the simplifications and assumptions involved, 
scenario comparison is the most valid way to derive insights 
from the two node model. The three scenarios compared in 
this paper are a base case described in Section II-A with an 
unconstrained network and the two zonal scenarios described 
in Section II-B, hereafter referred to as µGB strike price¶ and 
µzonal strike price¶. An unconstrained base case is chosen for 
comparison with the zonal scenarios as it best represents the 
current GB system, in which decentralised trading occurs 
without limitations due to available transfer capacity, as 
system balancing occurs once trading has taken place and, 
through being able to submit negative bid prices into the 
balancing mechanism to cover the opportunity costs 
associated with output reduction, curtailed low carbon 
generation still receives market revenues and subsidy 
payments [7]. 
      Data inputs to the model are shown in Table 1. Total 
capital cost figures prior to annuity factor discounting are 
shown (Total CAPEX) in addition to example values for year 
1 and 7 calculated using equations (5)-(7) (Model CAPEX). 
Carbon and fuel prices are shown only for year 1 and 7 and 
follow a linear relationship over the seven years. CfD strike 
prices were assumed at the levelised cost of wind technology 
in rGB, calculated over the seven year timeframe using model 
input data. Maximum capacity factors were assumed to be 
higher for wind generation in Scotland. The availability of the 
generators is simply represented by these capacity factors in 
the annual resolution, i.e. plant closures and wind resource 
are not explicitly modelled. All costs are discounted to the 
first year of simulation using a discount rate of 6.5%. 
Example demand values were used in Scotland and rGB, also 
linearly rising between years 1 and 7, with Scottish demand 
equal to 10% of demand in rGB.  
Table 1. Data included in the two bus model 
 Year 1 Year 7 Source 
Total CAPEX wind (£/MW) 1,802,905 [8] 
Model CAPEX wind (£/MW) 824,642.1 141,181.3 [8] 
Total CAPEX CCGT (£/MW) 612,370 [8] 
Model CAPEX CCGT(£/MW) 280,095.8 47,953.28 [8] 
OMfix wind (£/MW) 25220 [8] 
OMfix CCGT (£/MW) 42166 [8] 
OMvar wind (£/MWh) 0.105 [8] 
OMvar CCGT (£/MWh) 5.26 [8] 
Carbon price (£/tCo2) 18 50 [9] 
Fuel price CCGT (£/MWh) 20.58 24.74 [10] 
Strike Price wind (£/MWh) 104.4 - 
Net thermal efficiency CCGT 0.53 - 
Max capacity factor CCGT  0.8 - 
Max capacity factor wind Sco 0.3 - 
Max capacity factor wind rGB 0.25 - 
Discount rate 0.065 - 
Demand rGB (GW) 34.2 47.9 - 
Demand Scotland (GW) 3.42 4.79 - 
Net transfer capacity (GW) 3.3 - 
LCF constraint (billion £) 33 - 
B. Zonal scenarios results 
      Introducing zonal scenarios to the model includes the 
setting of zonal subsidy payments to represent the different 
revenue streams available to Scottish and rGB generation in 
the case of market splitting, as described in Section II-B. 
Figure 3 shows the resultant seven-year average revenue 
streams of low carbon generation in the two zonal scenarios, 
compared with the base case scenario. It can be seen that the 
two zonal scenarios produce a lower average zonal price 
(represented by zonal SRMC) in Scotland. This is due to 
market splitting in some model years in addition to a higher 
investment in wind in Scotland (where capacity factors are 
higher) driving down the Scottish SRMC when market 
splitting takes place, i.e. when exports from Scotland reach 
the network transfer limit. 
 
Figure 3. Revenue streams for low carbon generation for the base 
case and two zonal scenarios. Results for the GB strike price 
scenario are for case (b), described below. 
      Figure 4 shows the total installed renewable capacity for 
each model year in the base case and the two zonal scenarios. 
It is found that wind capacity is only built in the Scottish 
node in all scenarios, due to the higher Scottish capacity 
factor and thus lower levelised cost in this node compared 
with wind in rGB. In the base case, the maximum amount of 
wind capacity to hit the LCF constraint is invested in in the 
first year, after which CCGT is installed to meet the rising 
model demand.  There is less wind installed in year 1 in the 
zonal scenarios compared with the base case due to the 
transmission constraint limiting the amount of generation able 
to be exported from Scotland. In the Zonal strike price 
scenario further wind capacity is installed in each year as 
Scottish demand increases, until the LCF limit is met, which 
shown by a change in gradient in Figure 4, e.g. after year 5 
for the Zonal strike price scenario. This results in a higher 
installed renewable capacity in this scenario compared with 
the base case by year 4.  
      There are two results shown for the GB strike price 
scenario, labelled (a) and (b). This is because the iteration 
process for determining the SRMC and CfD top-up payments 
under the LCF did not converge, resulting in two sets of 
results that repeat rather than converging to a single solution. 
The model has perfect foresight over the seven year 
timeframe and can install, and thus dispatch, more wind 
generation when top-up payments are lower, under the LCF 
constraint. In the case of (a), results are the same as the Zonal 
Strike Price scenario. Wind capacity is built and utilised in 
years 1 to 5UHVXOWLQJLQORZ6FRWWLVK650&¶VLQyears 1 to 4, 
and thus higher top-up payments in these years in the 
following iteration (b). In this iteration wind capacity is only 
built in year 1 as the higher top-up payments use up the LCF 
budget.  This results in high 6FRWWLVK 650&¶V RXWSXW LQ all 
years as wind generation is insufficient to cause market 
splitting. High SRMCs result in lower top-up payments in all 
years. In the next iteration, the results are the same as in (a), 
as the lower top-up payments allow the model to invest in 
more wind while still keeping within the LCF limit. This 
pattern repeats and does not converge to a solution. The 
resultant installed capacities for the GB strike price scenario 
(b) give a lower overall installed wind capacity than the base 
case, the Zonal strike price scenario and the GB strike price 
scenario (a). This is due to the comparatively higher top-up 
payments to Scottish wind generation in this scenario, as 
illustrated in Figure 3, using up the LCF spending limit faster 
than the top-up payments for the other scenarios resulting in 
less wind generation overall, and thus also less investment in 
wind capacity. 
 
Figure 4. Installed capacity of renewable generation in the base case 
and each of the zonal scenarios 
      Table 2 shows the total generation for the base case and 
each of the zonal scenarios over the seven model years. It can 
be seen that the Zonal strike price scenario and the base case 
have a higher total wind generation than the GB strike price 
(b) results. This is due to the lower top-up payments to 
Scottish generation in this scenario allowing higher levels of 
generation under the LCF limit. This results in higher CCGT 
generation in the GB strike price (b) scenario to meet overall 
demand. The impact of this on the seven year total spend 
(investment in capacity, cost of generation and CfD top-ups 
under the LCF budget) and total carbon emissions is shown in 
Table 3, along with the percentage difference between the 
zonal cases and the base case. These figures are very similar, 
and the percentage differences do not exceed 3.12%. A 
slightly higher total spend and slightly lower total carbon 
emissions occur in the base case and Zonal strike price 
scenarios than the GB strike price scenario (b) due to the 
higher investment and dispatch of wind. 
 
Table 2. Total wind, CCGT and overall total generation for the zonal 
scenarios over the full seven year time horizon 
 
Total wind 
generation 
(TWh) 
Total CCGT 
generation 
(TWh) 
Total 
generation 
(TWh) 
Base case 442.18 2329.82 2772.00 
Zonal strike 
price 443.12 2328.88 2772.00 
GB strike 
price (a) 443.12 2328.88 2772.00 
GB strike 
price (b) 369.38 2402.62 2772.00 
Table 3. Total spend and carbon emissions for zonal scenarios over 
the full seven year time horizon 
 Total  
spend 
(billion£) 
Percentage 
difference 
with base 
case 
Total 
carbon 
emissions 
(mtCo2) 
Percentage 
difference 
with base 
case 
Base case 123.33 - 472.44 - 
Zonal 
strike price 123.38 0.04% 472.25 -0.04% 
GB strike 
price (a) 123.38 0.04% 472.25 -0.04% 
GB strike 
price (b) 120.54 -2.26% 487.20 3.12% 
IV. DISCUSSION 
      The results in Section III have shown a lower zonal price 
occurring at the Scottish node in the zonal scenarios due to 
market splitting and the high proportion of renewables in 
Scotland. This leads to a higher top-up payment to Scottish 
generation in the GB strike price scenario (b) when compared 
with the base case or Zonal strike price scenarios. Less 
renewable capacity is able to be installed and dispatched in 
the GB strike price scenario (b) due to these higher top-up 
payments using up the LCF limit. This scenario is slightly 
cheaper overall, but also produces slightly higher carbon 
emissions. 
      The results in Section III have also revealed a case in 
which the SRMC and top-up payment iterative calculation 
does not converge. This is due to the interaction between the 
LCF limit and the CfD mechanism in this cost-minimisation 
model. The CfD top-up payment is calculated using the zonal 
SRMC as the reference price, and the calculation of zonal 
SRMC is based on the amount of wind generation in each 
zone when a transmission constraint is present. As the total 
top-up is limited by the LCF constraint, a feedback loop has 
been created that installs wind capacity where SRMCs are 
high and top-up payments are low to meet the LCF limit, 
which in turn lowers the SRMCs and raises the top-up 
payments, resulting in a scenario where convergence is not 
possible.  
      Figure 5 illustrates the issue preventing the GB strike 
price scenario from converging. When wind penetration at the 
Scotland node is greater than 86%, wind generation becomes 
the price maker for the off-peak block, meaning that the 
annual SRMC drops to almost zero. As shown in the graph, 
the SRMC can only take one of two values in each year, 
depending on if CCGT or wind is setting the price. The 
relationship between installed capacity of wind and SRMC is 
non-convex. Altering the length of the off-peak block would 
result in this drop in SRMC occurring at a different 
percentage installed wind capacity. 
 
Figure 5. SRMC vs percentage installed wind capacity 
      The GB strike price scenario revealed this modelling 
issue as the only scenario with differing top-up payments 
dependent on zone. The Zonal strike price scenario and base 
case both have equal top-up payments to low carbon 
generation in both zones, which equally impact the LCF 
constraint, so convergence was not impacted by market 
splitting.  
      This modelling highlights the issues associated with using 
a cost-minimisation algorithm with CfD subsidies included as 
negative variable cost terms. In the case of CfDs the 
payments are a function of the wholesale electricity price, 
represented here by the SRMC, which adds an additional 
layer of complexity to the modelling with the iterative 
process required to ensure that input and output SRMCs 
converge.  
      The scenarios modelled here represent a case in which the 
cost of energy (with current low carbon generation 
incentives) is minimised, assuming perfect foresight and 
perfect competition. Further work could involve representing 
the problem as a profit-maximisation rather than a cost-
minimisation, including a representation of wholesale market 
revenues into the objective function, to represent the relative 
overall revenues to generators in the zonal scenarios. These 
zonal scenarios need to be represented with wholesale market 
revenue payments as well as CfD top-up payments to 
illustrate the impact of zonal pricing on the operational costs, 
and thus lifetime costs, of all generators. Without including 
revenue payments the GB strike price scenario includes 
higher revenues (top-up payments) for Scottish generators, 
when in reality overall revenues (market revenues + top-up) 
are the same for generators in both zones. Not including 
revenue payments also results in the Zonal strike price 
scenario providing the same revenues (top-up payments) to 
generators in each zone, when overall revenues (market 
revenues + top-up) are less for generation in Scotland. The 
inclusion of revenues involves another negative variable cost 
term for all generators, and essentially changes the nature of 
the problem from cost-minimisation to profit-maximisation as 
the overall generator costs can become negative.  
V. CONCLUSIONS  
      A two-node model has been described with an objective 
function that is a minimisation of the sum of operational and 
capital costs associated with investment and dispatch of 
generation, subject to various constraints including 
transmission capacity and the LCF budget. A simple model 
has deliberately been used to illustrate the issues with 
modelling CfD subsidies within a budget constraint. It has 
been shown that the introduction of locational marginal 
pricing whilst maintaining a system-wide strike price can 
result in a lower overall investment and dispatch of low 
carbon generation when compared with a case without 
locational marginal pricing and a case with locational 
marginal pricing and locational strike prices. These results 
suggest that if locational marginal pricing was introduced to 
GB, maintaining a system-wide strike price would not be the 
most cost-efficient solution to meet decarbonisation targets. 
However, it has also been shown that not all scenarios 
converge to a single solution when using an iterative process 
to calculate SRMCs and thus CfD top-up payments within the 
LCF constraint.  It is concluded that the relationship between 
installed capacity of low carbon generation and wholesale 
market price is non-convex, something that should be 
addressed in specific model developments. 
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